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Freedom's relationship to law is complex. Law may be freedom's best
guarantor, but also may represent a significant constraint on freedom. This
conflicted relationship often provides the mortar for a foundation upon
which a society is shaped. Given the significance of this relationship, it is
not surprising that to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the University of
Chicago Law School over five decades ago, important figures gathered for
a conference contemplating law and freedom.' Diverse figures such as
philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn, economics professors John Kenneth
Galbraith and Aaron Director, and New Jersey Supreme Court Chief Jus-
tice Arthur Vanderbilt provided diverse views on the relationship of free-
dom and the law.2 Their discussions included topics from freedom in dif-
ferent market places, including economics ones and ones for ideas.3 They
talked about protecting freedoms as tribunals considered matters, including
both traditional courts and bodies associated with the administrative state.'
And they considered the role of economic freedom.' Their dialogue re-
flected how freedom's intersection with law affects so many aspects of life
in the past, present and future, and it provides inspiration for a broad
analysis of the intersection that explores law's enhancement and limitation
of freedom.
LAW's ENHANCEMENT OF FREEDOM
Perhaps it is appropriate that the published Chicago Proceedings start
with the great proponent of free speech and civil liberties, Professor Meik-
lejohn, who offers his take on political freedom. 6 He self-describes his
* Associate Professor, The University of Alabama School of Law. I would like to thank my
faculty colleagues and the Alabama Law School Foundation for their support and Steven Corhern for
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1. See UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO SCHOOL OF LAW , CONFERENCE ON FREEDOM AND THE LAW
(Conference Series No. 13, 1953) [hereinafter Chicago Proceedings].
2. See id.
3. See id. at 3-36.
4. See id. at 39-85.
5. See id. at 89-111.
6. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The Priority of the Market Place of Ideas, in Chicago Proceed-
ings, supra note 1, at 3.
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mission as one of provocation in talking of the relative authority of the
voting citizenry of the United States and its law-making body, the Con-
gress. In describing an "uncompromising" Constitution, he declares "that
Congress and, by implication, the other governing agencies have no au-
thority whatever over the freedom of the political activities of the people
of the United States. With respect to politics, as the term is here used, the
people are sovereign, and Congress is their subordinate agent."' This is a
robust assertion of the power of personal liberty of a type that many might
most closely associate with freedom related to law. In making such an
assertion, Professor Meiklejohn draws on warnings by figures such as
Alexander Hamilton, who expressed concern about possible "tyranny of
the legislature." 8 As he moves his analysis specifically to an area of great
personal concern, the First Amendment, he claims that a mischaracteriza-
tion of the Amendment as "the principle of Free Speech" focuses on the
ability to use any words, noting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s ob-
servation that one can criminalize the action of counseling murder without
violating the Constitution.' But while so acknowledging that permissible
speech is not limitless, he does not so willingly accept instances where
courts balance conflicting national security interests and political freedom
by looking to Congress's choice between them. o He notes:
The lawmakers are thus authorized to weigh the conflicting inter-
ests of security and freedom and, if the security need seems more
important, to deny or abridge the claims of freedom. In a word,
when national danger threatens, not only freedom of business but
also freedom of thought may be required to give way.
That judicial ruling may, I think be challenged . . . . [I]n a so-
ciety pledged to self-government, it is never true that, in the long
run, the security of the nation is endangered by the freedom of the
people. Whatever may be the immediate gains and losses, the dan-
gers to our security arising from political suppression are always
greater than the dangers to that security arising from political free-
dom. Repression is always foolish. Freedom is always wise. That
7. Id. at 3. He further identifies other freedoms, such as "freedom of business activities" that
Congress has authority to limit. See id.; see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 1-3 (1948) (contrasting the constitutional status of different free-
doms related to matters such as expression and property).
8. See Meiklejohn, supra note 6, at 6-8.
9. Id. at 8.
10. See id. at 8-15.
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is the faith, the experimental faith, by which we Americans have
undertaken to live."
In concluding his paper, Professor Meiklejohn explains:
[O]ne of the working principles to which all judicial opinions
about political freedom should . . . be expected to conform. It is
the principle that, when citizens with their helpers are considering
questions of public policy, the government shall not take repres-
sive action against any belief or attitude because it is on one side
of the question rather than on another. No plan of action may be
outlawed because someone in office thinks it unwise or dangerous
or un-American ....
To be afraid of ideas, of any idea, is to be unfit for self-
government. Any such suppression of ideas about the common
good, not only the First Amendment, but the Constitution as a
whole, condemns with its unqualified disapproval. The freedom of
the market place of ideas, it says, shall not be abridged. That
statement proclaims the freedom of the fourth-or, shall I say, of
the first-branch of our government. It tells us that, in the plan-
ning of the Constitution, the freedom of the voter has top prior-
ity. 12
While Professor Meiklejohn's statements reflect the debates of his own
times, their poignancy as part of national debates on the primacy of certain
freedoms, and just law's enabling of them, would not be unfamiliar today.
This paper cannot hope to settle such debates, but rather draws on
Professor Meiklejohn to illustrate the passion of those who see law's role
as supporting particular freedoms. Interestingly, while Professor Meik-
lejohn might be less concerned about law's support for other freedoms,
such as freedom related to business or property, 13 such freedoms can draw
equal passion from others. Professor Meiklejohn's fellow conference par-
ticipant, Professor Director, questions the former's constitutional "distinc-
tion between the liberty of owning property and freedom of discussion." 4
Professor Director retorts by emphasizing the value of the "free market
for economic affairs" and the value of "voluntary exchange" in maximiz-
ing freedom." He notes:
11. Id. at 9.
12. Id. at 14-15.
13. See supra note 7.
14. Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, in Chicago Proceedings, supra
note 1, at 20, 20.
15. See id. at 21-22.
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[T]he political economists have shown better insight into the basis
of all freedom than the proponents of the priority of the market
place for ideas. The latter must of necessity rely on exhortation
and on the fragile support of self-denying ordinances in constitu-
tions. The former, on the other hand, have grasped the signifi-
cance of institutional arrangements which foster centers of resis-
tance against the encroaching power of coercive organization.
Failure to appreciate this essential element of freedom protection
among students of the law who minimize the importance of the
free economic market is especially striking. 16
More recently, law's support for freedom of contract has drawn atten-
tion. This may explain the vigor of debate around whether traditional com-
mon law notions of contract law have expired. In The Death of Contract,
Professor Grant Gilmore provocatively heralded the deterioration of no-
tions of contract law liability relative to the importance of tort liability."
In doing so, he drew on Professor Lawrence Friedman's conceptualization
of a traditional contract law tied to liberal notions of economic behavior
and the free market. 18 This might be characterized as a model of law that
ran parallel to notions of laissez-faire:
In both models, as [Friedman] put it, "parties could be treated as
individual economic units which, in theory, enjoyed complete mo-
bility and freedom of decision." I suppose that laissez-faire eco-
nomic theory comes down to something like this: If we all do ex-
actly as we please, no doubt everything will work out for the
best. "
In introducing a volume on the freedom of contract, Professor F. H.
Buckley notes how Professor Gilmore's 1974 take on the decline of con-
tractual liability was followed by other work that questioned freedom of
contract, and "argued for broad interference with personal preferences"
and free bargaining associated with negative aspects of "laissez-faire ide-
ology." 20 As the title of the volume suggests, various authors forcefully
argue that such contractual freedom has not seen its final days of legal
relevance.21
16. Id. at 24.
17. See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1995).
18. See id. at 6-8.
19. Id. at 103-04.
20. F.H. Buckley, Introduction, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 1 (F.H.
Buckley ed., 1999).
21. See generally THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, supra note 20.
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LAW'S LIMITS ON FREEDOM
Whatever one's preference for particular types of freedom and passion
for law enforcing that preference, understanding law's relationship to free-
dom requires further appreciation of its apparent, simultaneous limitation
of freedom. By constraining behavior with its rules of the game-whether
constricting the trading of ideas or more material items-law can be seen
to limit absolute free choice on some level. The Chicago Conference par-
ticipants seem to touch on this issue in interesting ways.
Some of the participants note the significance of rules and set proce-
dures in a free society under the law. For example, Chief Justice Vander-
bilt notes the linkage of substantive rights and procedure:
Any substantive right that cannot be adequately enforced in an ap-
propriate forum cannot truly be deemed a right. At best it is a
mere shadow of a right; generally it will prove to be simply a
snare and a delusion to its owner. Of what value, pray tell, is a
right acquired under a contract or the right to a piece of property
or even one's right to personal freedom if, when challenged, it
cannot be realized procedurally because of an incompetent judge
or juror or lawyer, or by reason of a defective system of courts or
of procedure, or an overcrowded docket so far in arrears . . . .22
Chief Justice Vanderbilt associates lack of attention to "procedural and
administrative aspects of the law" with "bringing the law into popular
disrepute."23 Of course legal procedural and administrative rules state
what one can and cannot do.24
A discussion of such rules is especially interesting given the time it
occurred-the 1950s, a post-New Deal era of the administrative state and
its rule-emphasizing system. Not surprisingly, administrative law became
the focus of a participant, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis.25 Professor
Davis notes the traditional idea of freedom as a "right to be let alone" and
therefore one where "the principle enemy of freedom is government. "26 In
22. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The Role of Procedure in Protection of Freedom, in Chicago Proceed-
ings, supra note 1, at 64, 64; see also Richard C. Donnelly, The Role of the Rules of Evidence, in
Chicago Proceedings, supra note 1, at 39, 39-53 (discussing evidence's protection of freedom).
23. See Vanderbilt, supra note 22, at 64.
24. To recognize procedures' ability to act as a constraint, consider Justice William 0. Douglas'
observation: "The history of man's struggle to be free is in large degree a struggle to be free of op-
pressive procedures." WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY viii (1954). Of course, the
solution to these "oppressive procedures" might also be grounded in procedure, such as the ability to
confront an accuser. See id.
25. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Development of the Administrative Agency, in Chicago Proceedings,
supra note 1, at 54, 54-63.
26. Id. at 54.
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his world filled with totalitarianism he accepts the continued importance of
"absence of undue governmental constraint" but also sees growth in free-
dom's meaning to include potentially the provision for basic needs such as
"freedom from poverty." 27 He sees expanded freedom in the United States
as underlying President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" of 1941
that went beyond "intellectual and religious freedom" to include "freedom
from want and freedom from fear." 28 But he also sees this expansion of
freedom in other documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the United Nations Charter, and new national constitutions in loca-
tions such as India and Israel that referred to items such as "the right to
work, to education and to public assistance" and "an equitable share in the
national income and a right to social security. "29 In turning back to the
United States and its regulations limiting certain economic activities, Pro-
fessor Davis explains that Karl Marx failed to anticipate regulatory agen-
cies when predicting revolution would follow from free enterprise. More
specifically:
Under our American system of government-protected, govern-
ment-guided free enterprise, the government assumes three major
obligations with respect to freedom-the negative obligation to re-
frain from encroaching upon the freedoms protected by our Bill of
Rights and the two positive obligations to protect freedom from
undue encroachments by other men and to increase freedom from
the forces of nature.
The expanded obligations of government have given rise to
new governmental tools, the chief of which is the regulatory
agency.30
This robust view of the state certainly indicates the possibility of constraint
of actions, and thus arguably some freedoms, as a method for furthering
other aspects of freedom. Later in the conference, Professor Galbraith,
while noting the need to be careful about it, adds his voice to the possibil-
ity of state action enhancing freedom:
[S]ociety must ... recognize that different groups will attach dif-
ferent emphases to progress along different dimensions of free-
dom . ...
27. Id. at 54-55.
28. Id. at 55.
29. Id. at 55 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Id. at 56.
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Free choice between given alternatives-producer sovereignty
in production and consumer sovereignty in consumption-
obviously suggests a minimum of government intervention in the
decisions of individuals. On the other hand, steps to stabilize or to
increase the income of particular groups may require active gov-
ernment intervention. This is true of measures to counter depres-
sion or to provide a minimum wage, or social insurance, or a farm
price program. But, by widening the range of choice, they also
enlarge economic freedom. Thus state intervention is not antitheti-
cal to economic freedom as some so ardently hold. It may only be
a design for freedom along a different dimension. On the other
hand, we have good reason to look critically at state interference
with producer or consumer choice. Any loss here must be for a
clear gain in the liberties of the other and larger groups or in the
form of larger and more secure returns and the extended choice
that these provide.'
While some might bemoan inherent conflicts of freedoms and choices,
Professor Galbraith at least feels, "There is a dilemma in the enlargement
of economic freedom only in so far as we insist on making one. "32 What-
ever level of angst one associates with such conflicts, they only continue to
raise debate today. In recent times, one need only look at the continued
debate over the make-up and powers of the recently constituted Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau33 or the extended controversy associated with
raising the federal debt limit to enable further federal spending.34
THE MEADOR LECTURES ON FREEDOM
Given the ongoing significance of the intersection between law and
freedom, continued study of this intersection is critical. In the Meador
Lectures on Freedom,"3 four leading scholars from various fields-
Professors Matthew H. Kramer,36 Mechele Dickerson, Ian Ayres,38 and
31. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Nature of Economic Freedom, in Chicago Proceedings, supra
note 1, at 109, 109-10.
32. Id. at 111.
33. See Jim Puzzanghera, As the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Launches, It Remains
Opposed by Most Republicans, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2011, at Bl, available at http:// articles. latimes.
com/ print/ 2011 /jul/21/ business/ la-fi-consumer -bureau- 20110721 (last visited Aug. 2, 2011).
34. See Obama, Boehner Clash on TV in Debt Endgame, MSNBC (July 26, 2011, 6:28 AM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 43864749/ns/politics-capitol hill/#.
35. The Meador Lectures honor Daniel J. Meador, former Dean of the University of Alabama
School of Law and the James Monroe Professor Emeritus from the University of Virginia School of
Law.
36. Professor Kramer is Professor of Legal & Political Philosophy at Cambridge University and
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Ian Haney L6pez39-add their contemporary voices to the important dia-
logue on law's relationship with freedom.
Professor Kramer builds upon his prior explorations of freedom to dis-
cuss freedom's ties to the rule of law.40 More specifically, he elucidates
the subject by contrasting different types of liberty, including the impor-
tance of negative liberty that he has emphasized in prior work. In explor-
ing shortcomings of other scholarly visions of freedom's relationship to
law, he usefully posits how certain conceptualizations of liberty and no-
tions of inviolable freedoms, if correct, would mean "that everyone living
within a society governed in conformity to the rule of law is unfree in all
or virtually all respects."4 1 Thus, he begins the Meador Lectures' revital-
ized discussion of freedom by providing an intellectual approach to under-
standing freedom and what otherwise might seem an insufferable conflict
with the law.
Professor Dickerson continues with an account of disappearing finan-
cial freedom and the negative ramifications of this occurrence.42 -
creasingly challenging economic world, choice does not necessarily equate
to full freedom. As she explains, "The increase in opportunities for people
to exercise their freedom to become overindebted has created an illusion
of financial freedom that masks the fact that overindebtedness itself erodes
financial freedom." 43 Her account of unregulated free choice of consumer
financial products adds to the tradition of scholars like Professor
Galbraith, who seek to better understand when state intervention may be
necessary to secure a better quality of life and more meaningful freedom.
Professor Ayres explores implications of ex ante self-limitations on
freedom by individuals through contract." He joins the dialogue with the
unique perspective of not only a scholar, but someone involved in a ven-
ture "where individuals enter into binding contracts putting money at risk
if they fail to meet their goals."4 5 This is an innovative approach that
might, for instance, help individuals battle bad habits with pre-
commitments to end such habits; and he offers an evenhanded account of
ex ante use of freedom to limit one's choices by revealing issues with such
Fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge.
37. Professor Dickerson is the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and the Arthur L. Moller
Chair in Bankruptcy Law and Practice at the University of Texas School of Law.
38. Professor Ayres is the William K. Townsend Professor of law at the Yale Law School.
39. Professor Haney L6pez is the John Boalt Professor at the University of California, Berkeley
School of Law.
40. See Matthew H. Kramer, Freedom and the Rule of Law, 61 ALA. L. REv. 827 (2010).
41. Id. at 842-44.
42. See Mechele Dickerson, Vanishing Financial Freedom, 61 ALA. L. REv. 1079 (2010).
43. Id. at 1104.
44. See Ian Ayres, Using Commitment Contracts to Further Ex Ante Freedoms: The Twin Prob-
lems of Substitution and Ego Depletion, 62 ALA. L. REv. 813 (2011).
45. See id. at 814 .
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an approach, including the substitution of other bad habits or limited ca-
pacity to tackle too many bad habits through self-control.46 His account
provides important insight into the very personal, individualized exercise
of freedom of individuals, which has been so important to others before
him.
Finally, Professor Haney L6pez concludes the lectures with a pirovoca-
tive look at mass incarceration and freedom in the continued shadow of
racism. 47 He notes, "To understand how a vision of government as a
source of freedom has come to be tarnished, we must look to those to
whom the state has denied freedom most forcefully-the imprisoned." 48
Thus, in looking at incarceration in America and the racial composition of
the prison population, he both seeks to reinvigorate a more open discus-
sion of race's continued impact as it relates to freedom and simultaneously
joins a broader historical debate concerning how government action might
help deliver freedom. Accordingly, Professor Haney L6pez along with
Professors Kramer, Dickerson, and Ayres are worthy inheritors of and
contributors to the ongoing dialogue on law and freedom.
46. See id. at 814-24.
47. See Ian Haney L6pez, Freedom, Mass Incarceration, and Racism in the Age of Obama, 62
ALA. L. REv. 1001.
48. See id. at 1002.
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